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Between the Global and the Local There Are
Regions, Culture Areas, and National States: 
A Review Article
Grant Evans
History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives, Revised Edition.
By O. W. WOLTERS
Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asian Program, in cooperation with The Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1999. Pp. 272. Maps, Notes, Appendixes, Bibliography, Index.
In 1999, the late O.W. Wolters released a revised edition of his influential, and still
stimulating, History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives. Besides
publishing the original 1982 text amounting to 102 pages, he has added a postscript that
is equally long where he attempts an assessment of his earlier work in the light of later
scholarly developments.
When the essay originally appeared, one could not help but admire its boldness,
scope and erudition. Since then, however, the meteoric rise of ‘globalisation’ studies has
perhaps made his scope seem timid, and post-modernism made his analysis of culture
seem passé. Regional analysis has been bypassed by the ‘global’ or outflanked by the
‘local’, and culture – we are told – is always ‘hybrid’. In his Revised Edition Wolters faces
the challenge calmly, and maintains his focus on Southeast Asia as a region and as a
culture area. There are good reasons for doing so too.
The idea of ‘Southeast Asia’ received extensive discussion during its definition as a
field of ‘area studies’. One of the best commentaries was by Donald K. Emmerson in
1984: ‘‘‘Southeast Asia”: What’s in a Name?’, where he suggested that this name
simultaneously described and invented a reality. His worry about the ‘invented’ part of a
Southeast Asian reality was that it could project a ‘homogeneity, unity, and boundedness
onto a part of the world that is in fact heterogeneous, disunited, and hard to delimit’.1
Like other scholars,2 Emmerson quite rightly makes much of the political origins of
Southeast Asia, with a major turning point being the Second World War when, as a
theatre for war, the region came into focus. Subsequently it became a theatre of the Cold
War and that produced a demand for knowledge of the region, especially in the US, and
spawned area studies programmes in the universities. Newly independent states in
Southeast Asia also began to produce their own studies of their societies and histories.
Finally, in 1967 ASEAN emerged as a regional organisation, but the burgeoning hot war
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in Vietnam and its aftermath delayed ASEAN’s aim for regional unity until 1999 when
Cambodia was admitted. Few would deny that this unity is primarily political, and many
comment on its fragility even in this regard now that the former ‘enemies’ Vietnam, Laos
and Cambodia are members, along with Myanmar (Burma).
The creation of ‘area studies’, however, led people to search for what are deemed
‘deeper’ cultural unities which, perhaps, can (in Emmerson’s words) ‘change a
cartographic convenience into an entity with an identity internal to itself ’.3 The
‘invention’ of a Southeast Asian reality occurred first, he argues, during World War Two
when the region was made ‘visible’. Second, it legitimated a term, ‘Southeast Asia’. Then
came the foreign policy concerns of the Cold War: ‘by attracting world attention and
creating a need to talk about the region, political disunity bolstered the semantic unity
of ‘Southeast Asia’.4 There is, therefore, something of a self-fulfilling prophecy at work
here that begins to produce, at least at some levels, common meanings across the region.
As within the confines of states themselves, so within the region diversities began to
get woven into unities. In a journal forum on ‘Reconceptualizing Southeast Asia’,
Anthony Reid speaks of the historical importance of Chinese networks and of the
creation of regional universities for the emergence of a sense of the region.5 Other
contributors focus on how political and economic exchanges within the region have
intensified, along with cultural exchanges in the form of academic gatherings, ‘high’
cultural events, migration and tourism, and to some extent, pop culture as well. Sports
events have also become important arenas for the creation of a sense of regional unity.
All of these activities produce a growing sense of ‘semantic unity’, and indeed cultural
unity, to the extent that people from the region begin to identify themselves as, for
example, both Malaysian and Southeast Asian.
Despite such developments, however, attempts to find sources of cultural unity in
Southeast Asia have rarely focused on the present or on recent history. Its unity, if there,
is assumed to be rooted in the past, and hence historians like Wolters have been active in
seeking it out.
Southeast Asia as a culture area?
Wolters’ argument is not directly phrased in terms of a culture area, but it certainly
tends towards something like it. He claims in the earlier edition to have ‘gone a
considerable way in substantiating early Southeast Asia’s “regional” status by assembling
what I proposed were “some widespread cultural traits”… and the experience of writing
this postcript has strengthened this opinion’. Thus he proposes ‘continuities extending
over the centuries’, even up to mid-1997. He hastens to add, however, ‘that I am
convinced as ever that the characteristics of sub-regional, or local, cultures are as
significant as the shared cultural traits…’6
There are some important innovative manoeuvres in the new postscript dealing
with what Wolters still calls the Southeast Asian ‘cultural matrix’. Previously he identified
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‘men of prowess’ possessed of ‘soul stuff ’ as one key element in this matrix,7 along with
widespread cognatic forms of descent which allegedly encourage non-lineal transmission
of power. He keeps these ideas, but influenced by the ‘cultural turn’ in history he now
focuses on processes of meaning formation, especially in relation to the ‘Indianization’ of
Southeast Asia which he prefers to rephrase as ‘self-Hinduization’, ‘because Hinduism, a
religious concept, was the crucial Indian phenomenon onto which Southeast Asians
latched’.8
Wolters makes some important theoretical points about this process of ‘self-
Hinduization’ which are generally relevant to the process whereby peoples assimilate
‘foreign’ cultural traits. Let me cite a key paragraph where he refers to the problem of how
people ‘make sense’ of their world:
By this expression I mean no more than the ability to organize what happens around
one in terms of one’s previous experience. ‘Making sense’ is the mental process of
understanding new things in the light of existing knowledge by spotting similarities.
In this way one can make plausible assumptions. One familiarizes the unfamiliar by
mapping the unfamiliar on what is already known. Fitting new experiences into a
familiar and often flexible category is another way of ‘making sense’. A new experience
can also be rendered by using the devices of metaphor or allegory.9
Thus local leaders in Southeast Asia, the men of prowess, on coming in contact with
Hindu ideas ‘gradually construed their own milieu and way of life as verifying what
Sanskrit literature… assumed to be universal phenomena… The process of self-
Hinduization would be facilitated because the texts could often present matters of local
common sense as examples of universal wisdom.’10 Wolters also upgrades the role or
power of words spoken by men of prowess in his evaluation of the matrix, and suggests
that the impermanence of personalised entourages accounted for a ‘present-mindedness’
and a cultural openness.
Wolters is pursuing other issues here as well, in particular arguments about the
formation of states in early Southeast Asia and their alleged centralisation. Here he
presents a strong culturalist argument, saying that a ‘single factor’, Hinduism, accounts
for the rise of states, not the multiple variables listed by archaeologist Charles Higham. I
do not want to enter into this argument, except to note that it forms a piece with the way
he argues later chapters.11
Wolters once again asserts the importance of the mandala-style polity for much of
pre-modern Southeast Asia, that is, a polity with fluctuating boundaries centred on a
king who radiated ‘soul stuff ’ out of which he constructed a personalised rule. I have no
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quarrel with this general argument, although I would challenge his presentation of
Ayudhya which, following Sunait Chutintaranond, he claims simply copied the
fluctuating, ‘pulsating’, mandala model. In fact Sunait himself shows that there were
inner circles more closely tied to the king and outer circles to the mandala, and these
inner circles have to be seen as a moderate form of centralisation, buttressed by the
important economic role of Ayudhya.12
More important for my concerns are Wolters’ arguments about the ‘localization’ of
foreign cultural elements, something he pursues at the end of his third new chapter,
‘Some Further Southeast Asian Perspectives’. Once again he refers to the way Sanskrit
materials were ‘localized’ to become ‘a new cultural whole. The process would constitute
“a local statement” about something else that the host culture made about itself.’13 What
is, of course, problematic about this statement is: how ‘new’ is the new cultural whole?
The chapter that follows on ‘Local Writing’ is a very interesting discussion of the way
foreign forms were used to make local statements, and indeed he calls for further
research that will ‘one day help to delineate specific literary cultures and illustrate the
phenomenon of cultural diversity’.14
Departing from historical ruminations, Wolters in his last chapter makes a bold step
into the present to re-deploy the concepts he has developed for Southeast Asian history.
One can hardly quarrel with the gist of the following passage:
The global market today is the latest instance in world history of a large-scale cultural
transformation, whereby a sense of the world in which one lives and therefore one’s
lifestyle are transformed. One thinks of ‘Hinduization’, the Reformation, and the
scientific revolution (with its responsiveness to the demystification of the world
grounded on Reformation ideology) as three such instances.15
What is unclear, however, is how we are to judge such transformations. Is what we
are witnessing simply the intensification of cultural borrowing today or some more
profound change? While I may agree with Wolters that we need to pay attention to local
processes when evaluating such borrowings, can we say, as he does, that ‘Southeast Asia
has now entered its neo-mandala age’?16 He explains that the connecting thread between
past and future:
may be a curiosity in the cognitive processes whereby former and present generations
of Southeast Asians could construct and reflect on what was and is happening to them.
Thus, I have come to believe that mandala and globalisation history in Southeast Asia
have something in common. In both cases the scene is multi-centered and boundary-
less, and the dominating character is immense prowess, a flexible category capable of
accomodating religious, political, or economic power.17
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But how continuous are cultural forms over time? How do we avoid the pitfalls of
approaches that, as Jack Goody puts it, ‘stripped societies down to supposedly continuing
elements, to themes and patterns that persisted through all adversity, immaterial
components that no bomb could destroy...’?18 I will return to this issue below, but in order
to focus on the idea of a cultural area, let me address the question of whether Vietnam is
part of a Southeast Asian cultural area or not.
Vietnam and East Asia
I begin with two flat statements: first, that Vietnam is politically part of Southeast
Asia, but second, that it is part of an East Asian cultural area. Of course, historian of
Vietnam Keith Taylor in his Birth of Vietnam argues that ‘The question of whether
Vietnam “belongs” to Southeast Asia or East Asia is probably one of the least enlightening
in Vietnamese studies.’19 Vietnam, he says, is a frontier and a ‘blend’ of the two – unique,
as the Vietnamese often like to imagine themselves. The full implications of such
statements are rarely realised by their authors because if we take them logically, then
Korea is also unique, as is Japan, and thus East Asia disintegrates while Southeast Asia is
left standing! (Though logically the latter should disintegrate as well.) In fact, logically all
macro-categories disintegrate into local uniquenesses, and indeed Taylor in his most
recent work (which I shall consider below) finds himself absorbed in ‘localised’
meanings.
Taylor’s 1983 work is perhaps the most sophisticated statement available of
Vietnamese nationalist historiography. The thrust of it is to assert that despite Sinitic
conquest a Vietnamese cultural essence persevered, and perseveres today. The aim of the
book is to demonstrate this primordial distinctiveness from ‘China’. Of course, in true
populist style, it is asserted that only the upper classes were truly Sinicised, and indeed it
was the Nguyen, the most Sinitic dynasty, which smothered the cultural essence (a key
element of which is supposedly the desire for ‘independence’) and ensured minimal
resistance to French colonialism. Taylor makes many such contentious specific claims in
this book, but what interests me is his approach to cultural borrowings.
Here we can also return to Wolters, who says in his revised book that ‘Today I do not
discern so sharp a contrast between Southeast Asia and Vietnam, at least as late as the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries…’20 His argument, which is a straightforward
empirical issue, is that it was only from the late fourteenth century that the state made a
concerted attempt to ‘Confucianise’ village social behaviour. This was an ‘ideological
watershed’ which ‘became in the late fifteenth century and thereafter a permanent
“change”, though not a change felt always and everywhere’.21 Thus, although there was an
important difference in state form between Vietnam and the other states of Southeast
Asia before this date, the overall difference is even greater after it.
One suspects that the modification of Wolters’ view of Vietnam derives from his
analysis and interest in local writing, already expressed in the first version of the book
and elaborated in the revised version. In the original text he poses the problem of
whether there exists a ‘Vietnamese’ poetry because the forms are all so clearly ‘Chinese’.
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21 Ibid., p. 146.
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His reply is that, yes, they are Vietnamese because they have been localised in content and
would have been vocalised in Vietnamese. And, he writes in his revised edition:
Vietnamese … came to believe that ancient Chinese classical writing exemplified
universal and not simply Chinese patterns of experience, and therefore they did not
hesitate to invoke Chinese literary passages as rhetorical flourishes to illustrate their
lofty status in the world and to ratify whatever they themselves had to say.22
But surely it is precisely this that locates the Vietnamese so firmly in an East Asian –
Sinitic – cultural universe: that is, their acceptance that it is only through these universal
claims that they can articulate who they are locally.
One major problem with discussions of Vietnam (and more generally of Southeast
Asia) is that ‘Chinese culture’ is often assumed to be monolithic. In fact, the history of
the Chinese empire has been a continual process of localised adaptations to the imperial
model, which itself evolves over time. Thus, for example, anthropologists and historians
studying death ritual in China will make a distinction between orthodoxy and
orthopraxy as a way of trying to understand localised variations on imperially ordained
funeral procedures.23 Or indeed, we can observe the emergence among some literati of
racially inflected ideas of ‘Chineseness’ in reponse to Mongol and Manchu conquest,
while others insisted on Confucian universalism.24 In other words, in China, too, there
has been an ongoing discourse between universalism and particularism, always expressed
in distinctly Sinitic terms. Moreover, what is consistently ignored by Vietnam scholars is
the ethnic Han response to foreign conquest, and the complex discourse over ethnicity
at the top of the Chinese state during Manchu rule,25 and the fact that up until its collapse
in 1910 the Ching Dynasty was considered by a significant number of Chinese to be
‘foreign’.
Furthermore, Vietnam scholars appear to associate Sinicisation exclusively with
Confucianism and state-building, whereas an absolutely fundamental part of Sinitic
popular and elite culture is Taoism and the wide-ranging set of beliefs and practices
which flow from it – geomancy, fortune-telling, medical practices, and so on. Regardless
of how ‘Confucianised’ the peasantry were, we can be certain that these popular beliefs
ran deep among Vietnamese and connected them, as they still do today, to a wider East
Asian cultural universe. This inattention to Taoism by scholars of Vietnam is puzzling,
especially as the spread of this ideology has arguably been one of the key cultural
practices used to transform the various peoples ruled by the empire into something
called Chinese.
As part of the assertion of a pure ‘Chinese’ model versus a hybrid Vietnamese one,
Vietnam scholars often assume a ‘Confucianised’ patriarchal Chinese peasantry, but as
far back as 1961 Maurice Freedman (himself a pioneer of lineage studies in China)
warned against simplistic assumptions concerning ordinary Chinese: ‘At the other end of
the social scale the family was, so to speak, scarcely Confucian. Poverty and powerlessness
produced, instead of a strong patriarch, a weak father.’26 Furthermore, the ‘Chinese
family’ is assumed to be rigidly patrilineal, whereas modern studies have shown the
importance of affinal relations and the continuing contact between daughters and their
original families.27 Furthermore, local practices of delayed marriage and marriage
resistance among Han have been documented, with an associated suggestion that this
may arise out of prior Zhuang practices.28
Probably one of the most unquestioned dogmas of Vietnamese studies to date has
been the alleged ‘higher status’ of Vietnamese women compared with their ‘Chinese’
counterparts. When such claims are examined closely, however, one becomes aware of
the paucity of studies on women in Vietnamese history and the flimsiness of such
assertions.29 Moreover, most of these analysts ignore scholarship on Chinese women, and
appear to be unaware of the complex origins of some of the restrictions on Han women.
For example, it can be argued that it was the Mongol Yuan dynasty, with its own view of
‘women and their dowries as household property’, that ‘rewrote laws to make it virtually
impossible for a woman to leave the household of her first marriage…’30 Such arguments
confound those of Ta Van Tai, whose studies of Vietnamese legal codes have formed the
bedrock of many of the claims made about the status of Vietnamese women. Ta, for
instance, has written that while ‘the Le Dynasty pursued a genuinely Vietnamese
tradition and upheld women’s civil rights on an equal footing with those of men, the
Nguyen Dynasty, copying the Ch’ing Code, paid as little attention to women’s interests as
did all the Chinese dynasties’.31
Typically, we have here the model of a static China and a dynamic Vietnam.
However, once we place Chinese culture and society back in history and acknowledge its
changes and diversity then much of the discourse constructed by scholars of Vietnam
collapses. David Faure, for example, has shown the intimate connection between the
expansion of Han state power and the construction of large lineages in the south, an
approach which accords with more recent anthropological approaches to kinship which
do not see it as some kind of independant cultural variable but as part of larger
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structures, including political and economic ones.32 A later collection by Faure and Liu
Tao Tao also underlines the regional cultural diversity of peoples within the boundaries
of modern China, in particular Han diversities.33
Perhaps the one Vietnam scholar who does not lose sight of the fundamental Sinitic
nature of Vietnam is Alexander Woodside, who states at the beginning of his book on the
Nguyen dynasty that the ‘Vietnamese people were sinicized centuries before Chinese
culture had even been definitively consolidated in areas that are today considered part of
China proper…’34 For someone with this approach the diversity documented by Liu and
Faure would hardly come as a surprise. In the book Woodside certainly acknowledges the
impact of Southeast Asia on the Vietnamese, in particular through the Cham and the
Khmer. Nevertheless, he does warn that ‘it is dangerous to be deterministic in ascribing
all differences between Vietnam and China to the Southeast Asian environment’.35 A
modern look at China will find that such cross-cultural interaction and borrowing is
common throughout the empire, and thus we can see the impact of Manchu and
Mongolian culture in the north, and Zhuang and other minorities in the south,36 and so
on. Looked at in this light, the counterposition of a hybrid Vietnam to an allegedly pure
‘China’ becomes less and less convincing.
What is absolutely fundamental to Vietnamese history is the formation of a separate
‘Confucian monarchy’ whose state provided an arena for the articulation of difference at
the highest level. This caused, as Woodside writes, a centralisation of political memory in
which ‘history writing became a major form of oppositional “boundary maintenance” by
Vietnamese and Korean state centers and their elites against Chinese hegemony’.37 A text
compiled in the eighteenth century, for example, ‘produced an inventory of lost
Vietnamese books and archives, going back to 1026 A.D., many of which had been
destroyed or carried away by Chinese invaders. This was “injustice collecting” on a
formidable scale… This memory would be transmuted later into twentieth century
nationalism.’38 Had, for example, the Cantonese formed a separate state, similar processes
would have occurred and Cantonese today would be considered as a separate language in
the Chinese language family and not as a ‘Chinese dialect’, and a distinct nationalist
history of these people would have been produced. Why it did not happen is not what
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concerns us here – but Vietnam does provide the comparative historian with some idea
of what could have happened.
Recently, historian Nguyen The Anh has inveighed against the ‘preoccupation to
prove the homogeneity and coherence’39 of Vietnam and its history, and the denial of any
internal ethnic or regional heterogeneity by subsuming them under a rhetoric of unity in
the face of outsiders. Keith Taylor, too, has spoken of the need to ‘breathe free of the
strangling obsession with identity and continuity mandated by the nationalist faith that
has animated virtually every twentieth-century historian who has written about
Vietnam, including myself…’40 What they, and Wolters too, wish to pursue are
increasingly textured, localised analyses of Vietnamese historical and cultural materials,
free of a priori assumptions. The rewards of this re-orientation have begun to flow in.41   
I wish to add to this repositioning the suggestion that once one concedes that the
model of a pure Confucianised China has collapsed, then Vietnam cannot be construed
as a paler or smaller version of it, but simply one variation on an East Asian cultural
theme.42 The reintegration of Vietnam into the East Asian cultural area, at least
intellectually, is crucial for breaking the nationalist stranglehold over Vietnamese studies
and for dynamiting the gridlock of ‘national uniqueness’.43
Anthropology and Southeast Asia
The debates over the historical contours of Southeast Asia have reflected the
increasingly close relationship between history and anthropology, with each turning to
the other for both empirical and theoretical assistance. Recent overviews of
anthropological studies of Southeast Asia have all raised the issue of the relationship of
the local to the regional, and indeed to the global. John Bowen, while acknowledging the
unities that historians have identified in the region, claims that Southeast Asia has been
‘the place where interpretive approaches to culture have reigned’, and where ‘it is the
ubiquity of publicly displayed cultural forms that gives the region its distinctive aura’.44
These interpretive approaches, epitomised by Clifford Geertz, have, however, treated
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cultural forms too semiotically as texts to be read by the anthropologist. The new twist
to this interpretive mode, Bowen says, de-centres the anthropologist and focuses on the
multiple ‘creation of meanings by differently situated actors, meanings that are often in
conflict with each other and that are not always resolvable to an internally coherent
structure’.45 He points out that it is impossible to pretend, as perhaps anthropologists
once did, that the local is not shot through with translocal influences.
The desire to know what ordinary people think of their culture no doubt accounts
for the greater emphasis in Wolters’ revised text on how people make sense of their
world, and for his analysis of local literature. Indeed, this demand has produced some
ingenious and subtle attempts to read all kinds of texts from the past in order to wring
further meanings from them.46 But, according to Bowen’s criteria, historians must always
fall short, because they do not have access to the polyphony of the past. A simplistic
demand for ‘voices’, however, drastically impoverishes approaches to culture because we
know that much of our learning and understanding is not expressed in language, nor is
it language–like.47 This, of course, entails a move back in the direction of at least
Geertzian–style interpretation of culture. Of course, certain elements of a culture may be
‘contested’, but there are usually shared ground-rules in the process of contestation. As
Aram Yengoyan remarked some time back in a book dedicated to the work of Geertz:
A dialectic theory of constraints assumes that each culture emphasises specific cultural
spheres … In some cases, one cultural form may override other structures, but in most
cases it appears that constraints stem from varied spheres of culture and constrict and
curtail the evolution of specific practices. At the same time, the interplay of constraints
within the social realm may determine creative cultural responses, specific in form to
the culture.48
These constraints, of course, are also in operation when specific cultures adopt,
borrow, assimilate externally-generated cultural forms and practices. This is precisely
Wolters argument about self-Hinduisation in Southeast Asia, where Sanskrit ideas were
made sense of in terms of already existing ideas of prowess. But the difficult issue is, once
these ideas have been taken on, what transformations do they engender, and at what
point does a qualitatively new structure come into existence? 
Cultural ideas and artifacts may be borrowed to bolster old ideas. So, if we observe
the following picture of two Lao aristocratic women in Luang Prabang in costumes made
of Chinese silk, facing a table with a Chinese-style tablecloth – and note that Lao are
renowned for their fine silk weaving – then it becomes clear that these traditionally scarce
goods are being used by the elite to display elite status. Or, alternatively, borrowings may
be used to express new ideas within apparently traditional ritual structures. One thinks
of the use of the ‘Western’ white wedding dress in the context of a modern Chinese
wedding ritual. The ritual itself outwardly conforms to ‘tradition’, but the dress is a
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marker of modern, romantic love, and of modern marriage. In other words the ritual, the
culture, has reconfigured itself. The dress and what it signifies do not constitute simply
an addition, but rather are part of a new cultural matrix. Terry Rambo makes a similar
point in his article on how the Chinese-derived ao dai came to be seen as ‘Vietnamese
national dress’ for women, when other items of dress were rejected, while Neil Jamieson
shows how attitudes to haircuts and writing systems were reconfigured as more or less
‘genuinely Vietnamese … as part of an evolving context at some particular historical
point…’ Both emphasise the way cultural elements are part of whole structures, and
derive their meaning from a total context, which itself evolves and changes over time.49
Methodologically the debate over borrowings for historians parallels debates over
globalisation among contemporary anthropologists and others. Marshall Sahlins has
released salvo after salvo into this debate to combat an anthropology that sees local
cultures falling before the juggernaut of globalisation. He is intent on stressing how local
cultures ‘indigenize modernity’ according to a local cultural logic:
      157
49 Terry Rambo, ‘Black Flight Suits and White Ao-Dais: Borrowing and Adaptation of Symbols of
Vietnamese Cultural Identity’, in Borrowings and Adaptations in Vietnamese Culture, ed. Truong Buu Lam
(Southeast Asian Paper No. 25, Manoa: University of Hawaii Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1987),
pp. 115-23; Neil Jamieson, ‘Relata, Relationships, and Context: A Perspective on Borrowed Elements in
Vietnamese Culture’, in the same volume, p. 129. Vietnam scholars who wish to assert that there is some
kind of ‘cultural core’ to Vietnam usually end up describing isolated cultural features, rather than
contextualised relationships. See, for example, John K. Whitmore, ‘Foreign Influences and the Vietnamese
Cultural Core: A Discussion of the Premodern Period’, in the same volume, pp. 14-16. Shawn McHale,
‘“Texts and Bodies”: Refashioning the Disturbing Past of Tran Vietnam (1225-1400)’, Journal of the
Economic and Social History of the Orient, 42, 4 (1999): 494-515, is the latest attempt to add yet another
cultural feature, body tattooing, as a mark that differentiates Vietnamese from Chinese.
This dialectic of similarity and difference, of convergence of contents and divergence
of schemes, is a normal mode of cultural production. It is not unique to the
contemporary globalizing world. On the contrary, its precolonial and extra-colonial
occurrences help explain the colonial and postcolonial… No culture is sui generis, no
people the sole or even the principal author of their own existence.50
Sahlins’ main interest is ‘tribal’ peoples who supposedly were destined to be gobbled
up by modernity; he points out that Eskimos continue to hunt, albeit now using
aeroplanes and guns. The problem with Sahlins is that he appears reluctant to recognise
that this may entail a fundamental shift in the culture. He generally avoids thinking
about the transformations that have occurred in state societies like Vietnam or Thailand,
which are considerable, and here Wolters’ perspective is much better, though he, too,
advances the idea of cultural continuity through ‘indigenization’.
One might like to go along with Wolters’ claim that Southeast Asia is entering its
neo-mandala age because of the cultural transmission of a particular cognitive structure.
Tambiah has argued for continuity within the changes undergone by the Thai state
because of the continuing symbolic role of the king.51 And I have argued for the
continued salience of similar symbolic structures in Laos even after the king’s
overthrow.52 Nevertheless, it would clearly be a mistake to think that, for example, the
Thai state today is simply some updated variant of the mandala state. Fundamental
changes have taken place in the whole social structure, not least because of nationalism.
An abiding methodological flaw in debates about Southeast Asia, partly driven by
nationalism, has been the search for allegedly ‘deeper’ underlying features of these
societies, over which are layered less ‘deep’ foreign imports.53 But we need to discard this
metaphor of layering in favour of a theory of cultural constraints suggested by Yengoyan.
The layering metaphor has been most powerful in studies of Vietnamese history where
strenuous attempts have been made to uncover a non-Sinitic, allegedly autonomous
cultural base. But even in his 1983 study Taylor realised he was chasing a chimera: ‘it is
not easy to define what this “indigenous tradition” was in specific terms, for the
indigenous content had been transformed during the centuries of Chinese rule’.54 As
Rambo mischievously observes, even if one were able to ‘reconstruct their pre-Sinitic
culture, we end up with something not authentically Vietnamese but instead with
something that modern Vietnamese themselves would label as “savage”…’55
Recently Taylor has attempted to bypass nationalist narratives and deny deep
cultural structures by going radically local. Indeed, his current approach is not so distant
from that articulated by Bowen when he writes that ‘my reading of the archive convinces
me that human experience is ultimately episodic, not evolutionary, and that all histories,
whatever the surface upon which they are formed, are equally discontinuous’.56 Taylor’s
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intention is to go beyond even Prasenjit Duara’s attempts to ‘rescue’ previously
suppressed heterodox narratives of the Chinese nation from nationalism (this is Nguyen
The Anh’s objective for Vietnamese history as well). Such historians, says Taylor, still
privilege ‘the nation’ as an historical subject, whereas he wishes ‘to imagine the past as if
the nation is not the subject of history, whether to be honored in itself or by appeal to its
regions’.57 Not surprisingly, Taylor finds himself questioning all macro-categories,
whether they be common languages, common cultures, or culture areas.
Taylor’s essay is stimulating to read and his radical deconstruction of the received
categories of historical writing about Vietnam is a breath of fresh air in a field already
seriously starved for oxygen. No doubt it will open up new avenues for research, and
indeed I could not agree more with him about the need to think about the past without
the distorting lens of the nation. But, appeals to apparently unconstrained ‘creative’
subjects are unsatisfying. As Marshall Sahlins argues, pure agency is no substitute for
cultural structure: ‘Although in theory structure is supposed to be a concept antithetical
to history and agency, in practice it is what gives historical substance to a people’s culture
and independent grounds to their action. Without cultural order there is neither history
nor agency.’58
Culture areas and regions/ecumenes as discursive spaces
The exploration of culture areas fell into abeyance in anthropology along with the
parallel programme of comparative analysis partly because of confusions and
disagreements about how ‘coherent’ such areas should be and what ‘traits’ to compare. It
had been essentially a positivist programme that assumed the unproblematic
comparison of theoretical objects such as ‘kinship’ or ‘economy’ across cultures. As
Ladislaw Holy writes, ‘It was not recognized that it is discourses rather than objective
forms that are compared.’59 Comparative research can proceed, of course, not only by
noting similarities but also by registering differences with the aim of bringing cultural
specificity more sharply into focus. If we agree that comparison is the basis of cognition
then it is hard not to conclude that most if not all fields of enquiry are at least implictly
comparative.
The identification of cultural areas suggests that the comparison of cognate societies
can be a source of useful knowledge, in a heuristic sense if not an explanatory one.
Sydney Mintz argues that at a certain level particular regions make up congruous
historical and conceptual units and any attempt to abstract discrete societies from them
inevitably produces distortions in our understanding.60 Not only do states and societies
within such regions influence each other through a process of interaction, they exchange
aspects of culture and indeed share these across societal and political boundaries.
Linguists, for example, have encountered similar issues when grappling with the idea of
linguistic areas. While the branching tree metaphor is used for establishing language
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genealogies and ‘families’, adjacent non-related languages may play an equally important
role in linguistic change.61 By analogy, culture areas are a bit like language families, while
regions/ecumenes are like language areas.
In a review of anthropological work in another area, Melanesia, R. Laderman has
also advocated the utility of the ‘culture area’ concept to counter the growing
dissatisfaction of anthropologists with exploring the diversely ‘local’ while facing the
obvious growing presence of the global. Like me, she naturally does not want this idea
associated with the fixed framework used for classifying museum exhibits. But, she
argues, whatever the problems with some of the original theories of culture areas, the
‘key point is that culture areas were, from the outset, less simply about areas than about
culture theories. They operated as heuristic bases for generalization; they organized
ethnographic particulars for theoretical and comparative ends.’ Furthermore, in an
argument that applies equally to Southeast Asia, she points out that whatever the
critiques offered by contemporary interpretivist anthropology of past practices, ‘we still
live with versions of the same maps and their associated ethnographic discourses’.62 This
latter observation applies to Bowen, as it does to Mary Margaret Steedly’s follow-up
survey of culture theory in Southeast Asia where, despite her claim that it is ‘arguably the
most insubstantial of world areas’,63 she continues to use it as her field of reference. This
underscores Laderman’s point that such areas have established themselves ‘as discursive
frameworks for organizing disciplinary practices’,64 even if part of their origin lies in
colonial or imperial imaginings.
In the conceptual debates over Southeast Asia we can see some perennial theoretical
issues. On the one hand, there are those who lean towards a view of culture as an
underlying generative structure, while on the other hand, we have those who see endless
cultural variation. As Holy argued some time ago,
It seems that for some time to come both basic assumptions will be resorted to in
comparative analyses. Those who prefer to see variations as endless perspectives point
out that the notion of the generative power of the underlying structure can be rescued
from its rigid formalism when more attention is paid to the way actors themselves
conceptualise, use, manipulate and interpret the phenomena which the structure is
assumed to generate. Those who advocate the necessity of the notion of an underlying
structure point out that the endless perspectives are in fact finite and that only some
perspectives from the endless multitude of the possible ones are adopted. To account
for that some notion of structural regularity has to be entertained. The limitation on
perspectives can be accounted for by discovering the structural principles which have
been recognized by any particular culture in question.65
Recent theoretical discussions would indicate that perhaps this dialectic is
interminable as writers snipe at each other from apparently contrasting positions. But, in
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fact, what we really see in all of these writers is a feature highlighted in John Hall’s recent
book on Cultures of Inquiry, where he points out that not only do various theoretical
approaches overlap, but each is implicated in the other’s discourse. While each approach
attempts some kind of totalisation,
Any totalization gains coherence at the expense of the aspects that it omits, suppresses,
or subordinates, and it is vitally dependent on these textual solutions. Therefore, a
‘supplement’ may be developed to identify absences – those things not contained by
the attempted totalization. There is always ‘play’ between totalization and supplement,
and, in turn, a tension between this textual play and history.66
Examples of such totalisations are culture areas, nations, or local or global studies,
to name just some of the concepts that I have referred to. None, however, are able to have
the last word. Indeed, what Hall identifies as ‘supplements’ can be explored by the same
author and in the same text as a subordinate parallel discourse. In a sense, one can see
this in Wolters’ desire to make both region-wide and local analyses.
The heuristic importance of notions of a culture area, or of a region/ecumene, is
that they enable and establish levels of analysis above the nation-state. Studies of local
diversities within nation-states can, of course, undermine the state’s totalising claims too.
The nation-state’s main aim, naturally, has been to try to create the illusion and the
reality of cultures being bounded by national borders. My critique of the practices of the
state does not intend, however, to claim that totalisation at the level of the nation-state is
somehow false or unreal. As a discursive reality it is as real as any of the others. Indeed,
through the deployment of the full resources of the state and its legitimating apparatuses
this level has become hegemonic (and remains so despite ‘globalisation’ claims), and as
such it tries to induce analytic closure.
Other discursive realities challenge this hegemony and therefore produce an
openness to which the culture of scientific discourse is committed. Culture areas focus
on cognate cultures and societies, such as Theravada Buddhist societies, and can bring to
light intriguing commonalities.67 Failure to take the idea of culture areas seriously can, on
the other hand, lead analysis astray, as it has done for so long with studies of Vietnam
which have been bogged down by a nationalist agenda. Of course, the research
encouraged by the use of concepts of culture area and ecumenes is comparativist, and
requires the exploration of similarities and differences with the aim not of building
causal models but of charting thematic issues, ‘deep analogies’,68 and contextual
meanings. For those interested in such an enterprise in Southeast Asia studies, the revised
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edition of Wolters’ book remains seminal.
